Healthcare service sector is one of the major applications of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) acknowledged as Wireless Medical Sensor Network (WMSNs). It deploys tiny medical sensor-nodes (MS-nodes) on the body of the patient to sense crucial physiological signs which can be accessed and analyzed by registered medical professionals. Recently, Khan et al. analyzed Kumar et al. 's scheme proposed for healthcare applications using WMSNs and observed that the scheme is susceptible to many security weaknesses if an adversary extracts the information from the lost smart card of some user. The adversary can access patient's physiological data without knowing actual password, can deceive medical professionals by sending fake information about patients, can guess the password of a user from the corresponding smart card, and so forth. Besides, the scheme fails to resist insider attack, lacks user anonymity and the session key shared between the user and the MS-node is insecure. To overcome these problems, we propose an improved user authentication scheme for healthcare applications using WMSNs. We show that the scheme is free from the identified weaknesses and excels in performance and efficiency scheme.
Introduction
Healthcare sector is witnessing a transition from traditional human-labor-dependent services to technology-based smart services. This changeover is the outcome of Wireless Medical Sensor Networks (WMSNs), a transmission technology employed by medical professionals (like nurses, doctors, etc.) to obtain the information like blood pressure, pulse rate, body temperature, ECG of the patients. This is achieved by deploying tiny MS-nodes like blood pressure sensors, pulse oximeter, body temperature sensors, and ECG electrodes on the body of patient. The MS-nodes sense physiological information from patient's body and then transmit it to the professionals in a wireless manner. Consequently, it cuts the cost of the human labor required for the purpose and facilitates the health professionals to observe and treat the patients as and when required. But patient's personal medical data may be misused by adversaries like corrupt persons, personal enemies, health insurance professionals, and so forth. Thus, there is need for the security of WMSNs to ensure access to patient's physiological information only to the authorized health professionals. Employing a user authentication scheme is a suitable method to achieve the desired security and establish a secure, efficient, and reliable healthcare environment via WMSNs.
After the development of simple user authentication schemes like [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , schemes for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] have also attracted a large community of researchers. Some work has also been proposed for healthcare applications using WSNs [14] [15] [16] [17] . In 2012, Kumar et al. [18] observed that most of the schemes proposed for WSNs such as [9, 10, 12, 13 ] fall short to provide security and also require heavy computational load and high communication cost. They proposed a user authentication scheme using WMSNs for healthcare applications and called it an Efficient-Strong Authentication Protocol (E-SAP) [18] . They claimed that their scheme achieves mutual authentication between the user and the MS-node and also establishes session key between them. They found their scheme finer than other existing protocols concerning cost, 2 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks performance, and security. Subsequently, Khan et al. [19] identified that the scheme of Kumar et al. suffers from many security problems if an adversary extracts the information from the stolen smart card of some user. As a consequence, the scheme is exposed to user impersonation attack and insecure session key generation between user and MS-node. They showed that the scheme does not go with the authors' claim as the mutual authentication between user and MSnode does not imply properly and an adversary can compute the session key to be established between. They also pointed out password guessing attack, insider attack, and MS-node impersonation attack on it. They found that if the identity of any user is revealed, it gives chance to many unauthorized/illegal persons to gain the personal medical data of patients and thereby generates problems for an authorized professional.
We feel that in addition to resist the prevalent threats, a user authentication scheme for WMSN should also provide user anonymity. Therefore, we propose a user anonymous authentication scheme using WMSNs eradicating the identified weaknesses of Kumar et al. 's scheme. We aim to provide perfect mutual authentication and secure session key generation between the active participants of the authentication protocol in the scheme. The rest of the paper is arranged as the description follows for the subsequent sections. Section 2 briefly explains the architecture of WMSN and its benefit in healthcare applications. Kumar in Section 5 along with its security analysis and performance comparison in presented by Sections 6 and 7, respectively. To end with, Section 8 gives the conclusion of this paper. In this paper, we use professional and user interchangeably.
Architecture of WMSN and Its Benefits in Healthcare Services
The architecture of the Wireless Medical Sensor Network is depicted by Figure 1 . There are four parties involved in the user authentication protocol employing WMSN as described below:
(i) Users: medical professionals like nurses, doctors, and so forth, looking for physiological data of the patient via WMSN.
(ii) MS-nodes: tiny sensors like temperature sensor, pulse oximeter, and so forth, deployed on the body of the patients.
(iii) GW-node: a powerful master node which plays the role of the registering authority and acts as an interface between the user and the MS-node.
(iv) Patients: they are under vigilance of medical professionals by means of MS-nodes for treatment.
First three participants are the active parties of the user authentication scheme. MS-nodes are tiny sensor having low processing power, limited computational capabilities, and limited energy and storage capacity [20] . GW-node is a powerful node with sufficiently large processing power, computational capabilities, and energy and storage capacity [20] . A user registers itself to the GW-node to become a valid user of the system. Whenever a user (medical professionals) wishes to obtain the physiological data of the patient, he transmits request message to the GW-node. Afterwards, the GW-node verifies the legitimacy of the user, if satisfied then it directs the desired MS-node(s) to answer to the user's request.
Benefits of WMSN in providing healthcare services are as follows:
(i) Improvement in healthcare services, 
Review of the Scheme Proposed by Kumar et al.
Initially, the GW-node chooses three secret keys denoted as , and , each of 256 bits. The GW-node also shares a secret key = ℎ( ‖ ) with all deployed MS-nodes by means of some key agreement method [21, 22] . The scheme has five phases each of which are described in succession. But before giving detail of each phase of the scheme, we summarize the notations and description used throughout the paper in Notations.
User Registration Phase.
The user (professional) U registers itself to the GW-node in registration center of the hospital, in the following manner:
(1) user submits his chosen identity and password to GW-node using a secure channel;
(2) on receiving { , }, the GW-node computes = ( ‖ ) and = ℎ( ⊕ ⊕ );
(3) GW-node stores {ℎ(⋅), , , } intoa SC and issues = {ℎ(⋅), , , } to U, where K is a long-term secretkey of the GW-node.
Patient Registration Phase.
A patient has to register itself in registration center of the hospital [23] . Patient submits her/his name to the registration center. On receiving patient's name, the registration center chooses a suitable medical sensor kit (i.e., MS-nodes and GW-node) according to the disease of the patient and assigns medical professionals (users). Then the registration center transmits the identity of the patient along with medical sensors kit information to the assigned professionals/users. Finally, a technician deploys MS-node on the body of the patient.
Login Phase.
A professional logs in to the GW-node in order to gain patients' medical data via WMSN. The user inserts her/his SC into the smart card reader and inputs and . Then the SC performs the following:
(1) It calculates * = ℎ( ⊕ ⊕ ) and compares * with the stored . For * = , the smart card continues further and else ends this session.
(2) It generates a random nonce M to compute = (ℎ( ) ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ).
(3) It sends login request = { , } to the GW-node with as the current timestamp.
Authentication Phase. On receiving the login request {
, } from the professional, the GW-node verifies the authenticity of U and computes a message to transmit to the desired MS-node in the following manner:
(1) It acquires current timestamp and, for ( − ) > Δ , discards the login request; otherwise it proceeds further.
(2) It decrypts as ( ) to obtain {ℎ( ) § , , , and § }. Also, it decrypts as ( ) to obtain { * , * }.
(3) It then computes ℎ( * ) and verifies the equivalences ℎ( ) * = ℎ( ) § , * = , and = § , if all the three equivalences hold, then it believes the login request to come from ; otherwise it terminates the login session.
(4) It acquires , another current timestamp and computes
When the MS-node receives { , } from the GW-node, it performs the following steps:
(5) It acquires current timestamp and, for ( − ) > Δ , discards the received message; otherwise it continues further.
(6) The MS-node performs the decryption ( ) and obtains { * , * , * , * , } to make sure that the request has come from the legal GW-node.
(7) It compares * with and with * , and if any of these fail to match, then it discards the message; otherwise it continues further. When receives { , } from the MS-node, its SC performs the following steps: (9) It acquires current timestamp and, for ( − ) > Δ , discards the received message. Or else, it proceeds further.
Then it performs the decryption -( ) and obtains and * . It compares * with , and * with ; if both the equivalences hold only, then the session key is assumed to be established securely.
Password Change
Phase. can change her/his password through the following stepwise procedure:
(1) inserts her/his into the terminal and inputs and .
(2) Then computes * = ℎ( ⊕ ⊕ ) and compares * with . If both the values match allows the user to enter a new password, otherwise discards the process.
(3) enters new password ( ) .
(4) computes ( ) = ℎ( ⊕ ( ) ⊕ ) and then replaces with ( ) .
Review of the Analysis of Kumar et al.'s Scheme
This section presents a review of the security problems of Kumar et al. 's scheme identified by Khan et al. [19] . This analysis is based on the assumption that an adversary can recover [24, 25] the information stored in smart card.
If extracts values {ℎ(⋅), , , } from the lost of a user, then he holds the master key which is stored in the of each user (professional). Consequently, the scheme becomes vulnerable to different attacks described as follows.
User Impersonation Attack. Having master key in hand,
can impersonate any user of the system to obtain patient's physiological information. To impersonate , the attacker intercepts the login request { , } of and decrypts as ( 4.3. Password Guessing Attack. We further extend the above two threats to a more harmful vulnerability. If successfully guesses the identity of the user from whose smart card he extracts the secret key , then he can guess the password of . For this, guesses as the probable password, computes * = ℎ( ⊕ ⊕ ), and verifies if * = . If so, it implies success of in guessing the of . In fact, it is complete violation of security since holds user's along with user's identity and password so he can behave as the legal user .
Illegal Logged-In Users Using Legal Identity.
can guess the identity of any user as described in Section 4.2; he can misuse for crafting other damage to the security of the scheme as described below.
(1) applies for her/his registration by submitting and , where is a random password chosen by .
(2) In return, the GW-node provides a = {ℎ(⋅), , , } with = ℎ( ⊕ ⊕ ) and = ( ‖ ).
The role of password in the login-authentication procedure of the scheme is up to confirming the legitimacy of the user by her/his smart card. From then on, only user's identity is used to authenticate at the GW-node. As a result, there are two pictures.
(i)
can successfully log in as the legal user with the received = {ℎ(⋅), , , }. inserts her/his into the terminal and inputs and . Once and are verified, computes = (ℎ( ) ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ) and sends the login request { , } to the GW-node. Clearly, the GW-node considers it as a valid login request from the legitimate user since it is computed using valid in .
(ii) has open option to distribute the user's identity among malicious persons interested to obtain patient's private health data in an illicit way. These persons can register themselves in similar manner as just explained in the previous scenario and can access data through MS-node.
can also distribute the values {ℎ( ), , } in place of among these persons. Then it is possible to impersonate as described in Section 4.1. In case such an illegal access is detected by the system, it will raise a question on the credibility of the valid user (medical professional) whose identity is misused by .
Insecure Session-Key.
can compute the session key to be used between a user and a MS-node during a particular session. Suppose recovers the values {ℎ( ), , } out of of the intercepted login request of U. Then he attempts to guess the identity as described in Section 4.2 and uses timestamp from the corresponding intercepted login request { , }. Then can easily compute the session key -= ℎ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ) to be used by and the MS-nodewith identity . Hence, the shared session key Ksess U-Sn is insecure and can decrypt the confidential messages communicated between MS-node and .
MS-Node Impersonation
Attack. An active attacker having secret key obtained from a lost or stolen SC can perform decryption of 's for as many users as he wants. As a result, he can obtain the hashed value like ℎ( ) of all the target users. Next, can guess the identity for each ℎ(
) and tabulates the values {ℎ( ), }. After that, can impersonate the MS-node to deceit legitimate users as explained below.
(1) As finds a login request { , } on the network, he intercepts and blocks it and quickly decrypts to see if ℎ( ) included in it is present in the table maintained or not. If not then it relays the login request to GW-node.
(2) But if ℎ( ) exists in the tabular record, then keeps the login request blocked and uses from the record, values { , } from current decryption, and from login request; quickly computes -= ℎ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ).
(3) It computes = -( ‖ ‖ ) and sends { , } to , where is the current timestamp chosen by .
(4) Obviously will qualify the verification test at the user side as it consists of valid { , } and fresh timestamp .
It is noticeable that -, the common session key is computed by and but believes it to be confidential between him and the MS-node. Moreover, can misguide the user doctor by sending fake data about the patient. Consequently, the patient may receive false treatment, thus denying the goal of healthcare through WMSN. confirms the legality of GW-node to MS-node but reverse is not achieved. Thus, GW-node has no way to ensure itself of connecting with real MS-node. Hence, mutual authentication between MS-node and GW-node is not achieved in the scheme.
Besides, the authors claim that their scheme achieves mutual authentication between MS-node and user . Mutual authentication between and MS-node is established using the session key
But as shown in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, can compute and impersonate , respectively. Therefore, mutual authentication between and MS-node is not achieved in the scheme.
Insider
Attack. For convenience people use the same password for more than one application. During registration phase of the scheme, user submits her/his password plaintext to GW-node. So, the system administrator at the GWnode easily comes to know the password of each user and he can use it to impersonate at servers, where is registered with the same password. Although authors assume the hospital registration center as a trusted authority, we think that often the trustworthy breaches the trust. Therefore, plaintext password should not be submitted to any second party.
The Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme has the same number of phases as in Kumar et al. 's scheme. Each of the phases is detailed below along with Tables 1, 2, and 3. The GW-nodekeeps only one master secret key (length 256 bits). Besides, the GW-node shares a secret key = ℎ( ‖ ) with MS-nodes using some key agreement method [21, 22] .
User Registration Phase.
The user (professional) registers itself to the GW-node in registration center of the hospital, in the following manner.
(1) User choses her/his identity and submits it to the GW-node using a secure channel. 
Patient Registration Phase.
This phase is identical to that in Kumar et al. 's scheme so we avoid its explanation here.
Login Phase.
A professional logs in the GW-node in order to gain patients' medical data via WMSN. The user inserts her/his into the smart card reader and inputs and . Then the SC performs the following.
(1) It retrieves = ⊕ ( ‖ ), = ⊕ ( ‖ ) and computes * = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ). For * = it continues further; otherwise it stops the session.
(2) It generates a random nonce and computes 1 = ⊕ ℎ( ) and = (ℎ( ) ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ).
(3) sends { , 1 , } as login request to GWnode, where is the current timestamp.
Authentication Phase.
When the login request = { , 1 , } from is received by the GW-node, it executes the following steps.
(2) It retrieves = 1 ⊕ ℎ( ) and decrypts as (
) to obtain {ℎ( ) § , , , § and § }.
It verifies the equivalence § = , and if correct, then it decrypts as ( ) to obtain * and * .
(3) It then computes ℎ( * ) and verifies the equivalences ℎ( ) * = ℎ( ) § , * = , and = § , if all the three equivalences hold then believes the login request to come from ; otherwise terminates the login session. 
Inserts , , and in so that = {ℎ(⋅), , , , } (4) replaces , , and with ( ) , ( ) , and( ) , respectively.
Analysis of the Security of the Proposed Scheme
This section, examines the security of the proposed scheme. We will display that the proposed scheme is secure under the same assumption subject to which Kumar et al. 's scheme is attackable. The assumption is that an attacker can extract [24, 25] the information stored inside smart card.
Resisting User Impersonation Attack.
To impersonate as the user, has to compute a valid login request. Suppose obtains the lost smart card of and extracts the values { , , , } stored in it. Though is involved in both the components { and 1 } of the login request, but without , ℎ( ), and computation of these components is incomplete. To recover from , the attacker needs to know of user's identity and password. On the contrary, to obtain from or , the attacker should hold or , respectively. Further, it is not feasible to obtain or from due to noninvertible nature of hash function. Thus, the scheme resists user impersonation attack.
Providing User Anonymity. If
intercepts the login request { , 1 , } of , then he needs to obtain ℎ( ) by decrypting . But neither knows nor can recoverit by extracting information {ℎ(⋅), , , , } from the lost smart card of some user; say . To take out from , the attacker should know user's identity and password. In fact, key required to encrypt/decrypt is not stored directly in user's smart card and is different for each user. Therefore, cannot obtain ℎ( ) and guess the identity as in Kumar et al. 's scheme. On the other hand, to procure identity from , , or is infeasible. It requires knowledge of keys and to gain out of or , respectively. Moreover, one-way property of hash function does not allow extraction of out of . Therefore, cannot gain the identity of a user and hence the scheme provides user anonymity. International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks and . As described in Section 6.2, cannot gain the identity of a user either from the lost smart card of a user or from an intercepted login request. Besides, is not available as plaintext in 's and is not obtainable from without having exact values of and . Thus, the scheme resists password guessing attack.
Resisting Illegal Logged-In Users Using Legal Identity.
Since it is not possible to guess or know the identity of a logging user, cannot register itself to the GW-node with legal identity and fake password . Hence cannot harm the security of the scheme by misusing the identity. As a result, the scenario of many illegal users logged in with legal identity of a registered user is not possible in the proposed scheme. ) which is dynamic because of fresh timestamp and one time usable random number . Although is fixed but is known only to the GW-node and the MSnode so no one except these two entities can compute the valid -. Moreover, cannot procure from without knowing ; from 1 without knowing ; and from 2 * due to noninvertible nature of hash function. Session key between and MS-node is -= ℎ( ‖ ‖ ) which an attacker cannot compute without knowing . Thus, the scheme establishes independent and secure session keys between every pair of the participating entities. 6.6. Resisting Sensor-Node Impersonation Attack. In order to impersonate the MS-node, should be able to compute the response messages sent by it to the GW-node and . To compute 1 = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ) ⊕ ℎ( ‖ ) and 2 * = ℎ( ‖ * ‖ * ‖ ) the knowledge of and * is required, respectively. Since = ℎ( ‖ ) is shared secretly by GW-node with MS-node using some key agreement method [21, 22] and its computation involves master secret key and identity of the GWnode, cannot access or compute . Further / * is not retrievable from , 1 , and 2 without knowing and , respectively. Moreover, one-way property of hash function prohibits extraction of / * from 2 * . Hence cannot impersonate the MS-node to make fool of the user and GW-node. 6.7 . Providing Mutual Authentication between Every Pair of the Participating Entities. At each of the three ends, any received message undergoes at least two-step verification test to verify the authenticity of the sender. For every message, firstly timestamp is checked for freshness followed by one or more equivalences holding tests. The proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication between and GW-node by exchange of messages { , 1 , } and { 1 , }. When GW-node receives { , 1 , } from , in addition to timestamp freshness test, the equivalences ℎ( * ) = ℎ( ) § , * =
Providing Secure Session Key between Every Pair of the
, and = § are required to guarantee the legitimacy of U. Similarly, for { 1 , } received by from GW-node, the equivalence * = , * = , and * = should hold to prove the validity of the GW-node.
Mutual authentication between the GW-node and the MS-node is achieved through the messages { 2 , , } and { 1 , }. Corresponding to the message { 2 , , }, the equivalence * = is imperative to confirm the legitimacy of GW-node and hence of to MS-node. On the other hand, only the designated MS-node can compute 1 = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ) ⊕ ℎ( ‖ ) and the authorized GW-node can retrieve correct ℎ( ‖ ) from 1 as the computation and retrieval involves use of hence mutually authenticate the entities to each other.
As just discussed, is authenticated to the MS-node via message { 2 , , } with which GW-node is verified. Finally, the legitimacy of MS-node is ensured to by means of the equivalence 2 = 2 * . In this way, our scheme provides perfect mutual authentication.
Resisting Insider Attack. During registration phase, submits only his identity
to the GW-node at the hospital registration center. The GW-node provides secret keys and to the user. Then using his chosen password and identity , the user itself computes = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ) and embeds and as = ⊕ ( ‖ ) and = ⊕ ( ‖ ), respectively. Finally, inserts , , and in . Since the insider of the system never receives user's password, privileged insider attack is not applicable on the scheme.
Performance Analysis of the Proposed Scheme via Comparison
Now, we compare our scheme with Kumar et al. 's scheme [18] to present a comparative analysis of its performance and efficiency. Table 4 is about memory space required by smart card and computational complexity/cost in both the schemes. Table 4 shows that the memory space required by the smart card in Kumar et al. 's scheme and the proposed scheme is 512 bits and 640 bits, respectively. Further, it is noticeable that our scheme adds some hash functions (ℎ(⋅)) but remarkably cuts the number of time consuming symmetric cryptography operation ( ) at each of the three ends. The most important aspect is that there is no symmetric Table 5 that with extra memory capacity of 128 bits in smart card and some extra hash functions, the proposed scheme achieves higher performance. The most significant feature of our scheme is the establishment of mutual authentication and session key between every pair of the three participating entities.
Conclusion
A secure and efficient user authentication scheme is essential to offer reliable and proficient healthcare services via WMSNs. This work is motivated by the security problems of Kumar et al. 's scheme for healthcare services using WMSNs. In this paper, we have designed a user authentication scheme to eradicate the security problems of Kumar et al. 's scheme. Our scheme is user anonymous and is free from risks occurring due to loss of smart card of a user. It defies insider attack and password guessing attack. The most important feature of the scheme is that it establishes mutual authentication and provides session key between every pair of the participating entities, that is, user, GW-node, and MS-node.
Notations
: User (professional)
: Attacker :
Identity of : P a s s w o r do f :
Smart card of -node:
A powerful master node called Gatewaynode -node:
Medical sensor-node :
Identity of GW-node :
Identity of MS-node , , :
Long-term secret keys of GW-node :
Identity of patient :
Random nonce generated at the user side , , ,
: Current timestamps generated at the user side , , :
Current timestamps generated at the GWnode side :
Current timestamps generated at the MSnode-side Δ :
Time interval for expected transmission delay ℎ(⋅):
One-way hash function :
Symmetric cryptographic operation (encryption/decryption) ⊕:
B i t w i s e X o r o p e r a t o r ||:
Concatenation operator.
